Weapons of Mass Destruction and Public Health

Nuclear, Radiological Weapons
Steve Fetter - physicist and professor of public policy, University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs
Expertise: nuclear and radiological weapons; arms control; health effects of radiation
Fetter says:

"A dirty bomb could have huge economic and psychological effects. Evacuation and decontamination of an area could run into billions of dollars and create panic. But a dirty bomb would probably not cause any radiological deaths or even make people sick right away, except for the impact of the explosive blast itself. Decades later there might be an increase in cancer cases, but this would be very difficult to detect statistically."

Nuclear and Radiological Weapons
Milton Leitenberg - senior research scholar, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs
Expertise: nuclear, radiological and biological weapons; recent wars and conflicts; arms control
Leitenberg says:

"Dirty bombs have been talked about since World War II when nations thought about using radioactive material from nuclear reactors, but the idea was abandoned in favor of much more efficient nuclear weapons. Today, the possibility that non-state actors would acquire and be able to handle such high-level material is highly unlikely."

Biological, Chemical Weapons
Elisa D. Harris - research associate, Center for International Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs
Expertise: military uses and control of chemical and biological weapons
Harris says:

"We need to take the threat seriously, but we also have to realize that there are significant technical and operational hurdles that would have to be overcome by a non-state entity to produce and use chemical or biological agents, especially on a large scale."

Credentials: director for non-proliferation and export controls on the National Security Council, 1993-2001; researcher in the Foreign Policy Studies program at the Brookings Institution and the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard; author of numerous articles on chemical and biological warfare
Contact: 301-405-8676 (office); eh138@umail.umd.edu; or Neil Tickner, 301-405-4622; 301-257-0073 (after-hours)
Web site: www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/people/EHarris.html

Arms Control, Reducing Bioterror Risk
John Steinbruner - professor and director of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs Expertise: arms control and nuclear weapons; managing bioterror risk; international security
Steinbruner says:

"Better information management is a key to reducing the threat from nuclear weapons and dangerous pathogens." Steinbruner is examining the feasibility of creating a technical, international accounting system to track and control materials that could be transformed into weapons of mass destruction.

Attacks on U.S. Troops
Warren Campbell - lecturer, Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute, University of Maryland; retired Army Lieutenant Colonel, Medical Service Corps
Expertise: risks and amelioration of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents in both military and civilian settings; specialist in combat medical operations and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) casualty care Credentials: temporarily recalled to active duty in 2002, for Operation Enduring Freedom, as director of health services support for a Combined Joint Task Force in Kuwait, designated to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high explosive events in the Middle East, Afghanistan, or the Horn of Africa; retired in 1993 as project officer for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
Contact: 301-226-9936 (office); 240-882-3718 (cell); wcampbell@mfri.org
Web site: www.mfri.org/wcampbell@mfri.org

Emergency Response and Training
Russell Strickland - assistant director, Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute at the University of Maryland, in charge of field programs division
Expertise: trains Maryland first-responders, including training for assessing and handling hazardous materials incidents; involved in emergency management planning

Credentials: chair of the Maryland Terrorism Forum's Training Workgroup; involved with the Maryland Fire Service Personnel Qualifications Board, the Chesapeake Society of Fire and Rescue Instructors and the Maryland Council of Fire and Rescue Academies; active in Maryland fire, rescue and Emergency Medical Services for more than 30 years
Contact: 301-226-9924 (office); 410-964-3307 (home); 240-885-5834 (cell) rstrickland@mfri.org Website: http://www.mfri.org/

Emergency Response and Training
Steven T. Edwards - director, Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute of the University of Maryland
Expertise: incident management systems; fire service strategy and tactics; training and educational systems for terrorism response (the Fire and Rescue Institute trains Maryland first responders, including assessment and handling hazardous materials incidents)

Credentials: chair, Board of Directors of the Safety Equipment Institute; vice chair of the Congressional Fire Service Institute National Advisory Committee; in 1997, elected president North American Fire Training Association
Contact: 301-226-9960 (office); 301-343-4771 (cell); director@mfri.org Website: www.mfri.org/

Microbiology of Terror
Sam W. Joseph - professor of cell biology and molecular genetics, University of Maryland
Expertise - bioterror; lab security; medical microbiology; E. coli, salmonella
Joseph says:

"Bioterrorists don't necessarily always want to kill people, but they may want to make a lot of people sick enough to put a large load on our medical resources and to get to us psychologically. Dangerous organisms are not that hard to get hold of in laboratories."

Drinking Water and Bioterror
Gary Felton - professor of bioenvironmental engineering/water quality, University of Maryland
Expertise: water quality and contamination
Felton says:

"Fresh water bodies, such as reservoirs, are better carriers of biological agents. However, the large volumes of toxins necessary to produce sufficient concentrations, the passage of water through treatment plants and long travel times make a lethal attack unlikely. Direct attack at the infrastructure is more likely."

Pesticide Security
Amy Brown - professor of entomology and coordinator, extension pesticide education and assessment, University of Maryland
Expertise: large-scale application of agricultural pesticides; pesticide educator
Brown says:

"Even a pesticide that's not especially toxic could cause big problems if used as a weapon of terror. For instance, a reservoir that's had pesticide dumped in it doesn't even have to be a true health threat to be cut off for human use. If the amount of contaminant violates our laws, we can't use the water."

Air-handling Systems and Bioterror
Bruce Jarvis - professor of chemistry and biochemistry, University of Maryland
Expertise: "sick buildings" - human exposure to toxins, lurking in air-handling systems
Jarvis says:

"Chemicals made from biological elements, such as mold and fungus, could be effective weapons of terrorism if they were let loose in air handling systems." Credentials: worked with biological chemical compounds used in Vietnam and with "yellow rain," fungal toxin developed in the 1980's; frequently interviewed about "sick buildings"

Animals as Terror Targets
Ted Mashima - associate director, Center for Government and Corporate Veterinary Medicine, Virginia-Maryland Regional College of Veterinary Medicine; DVM
Expertise: disaster planning for animals in captivity; risks to humans in pet rescues; education and training for ecosystem health and conservation
Mashima says:

"Wildlife is the forgotten entity in the bioterrorism arena. They are susceptible to many of the same organisms as humans. Zoo animals may be especially vulnerable. Disease in a zoo could be devastating."

Gas Masks in the Workplace
Arthur T. Johnson - professor of biological resources engineering, University of Maryland
Expertise: effects of respirators on work output
Johnson says:

"First responders at the World Trade Center were probably working at 75 percent of their capacity because of their respirators. With better training and better designed masks, more lives might have been saved."